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NATURAL RESOURCES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NATURAL RESOURCES/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A state statute banning the export out of state of hydroelectric power generated
within the state, absent any Congressional authorization, is "precisely the sort of protectionist regulation" prohibited the states by
the commerce clause. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,

455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
BACKGROUND

A New Hampshire statute enacted in 1913 prohibits exportation of
electric power generated inside New Hampshire without prior permission
of the State Public Utilities Commission (PUC, Commission).' Until
1980, the New England Power Company (NEPC, Company) had routinely
applied for and received such permission. In 1980 the PUC refused NEPC
permission to export hydroelectric power generated within New Hampshire. Instead, the Commission ordered NEPC to make arrangements to
sell the Company's New Hampshire-generated hydroelectric power inside
the state. In accordance with a Commission report accompanying the
order, the PUC found that doing so would save New Hampshire consumers
approximately $25 million a year due to the lower cost of water-generated
electricity. The Commission therefore concluded that NEPC's hydroelectric energy was "required for use within the State of New Hampshire,"
language which quoted the exportation statute and which provided justification for the Commission's embargo order by invoking the State's
police power.
NEPC, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the Attorney General
of Rhode Island all appealed the New Hampshire PUC' s order to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. Their claims were: 1) that the Commission's
order was preempted by the Federal Power Act2 ; and 2) that the order
imposed impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in violation of
the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution3 . The New Hampshire
Supreme Court upheld the PUC's order. The state Supreme Court found
1. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §374:35 (1966): "No corporation engaged in the generation of
electrical energy by water power shall engage in the business of transmitting or conveying the same
beyond the confines of the state, unless it shall first file notice of its intention so to do with the
public utilities commission and obtain an order of said commission permitting it to engage in such
business. Any such corporation engaged in the business of transmitting or conveying such electrical
energy beyond the confines of this state pursuant to such order shall discontinue such business in
whole or in part, to such extent and under such conditions as the commission may order, whenever,
after notice to such corporation shall find that such electrical energy or the portion thereof affected
by said order is reasonably required for use within this state and that the public good requires that
it be delivered for such use."

2. 16 U.S.C. §§792-824 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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that a "savings clause", § 201(b)4 of the Federal Power Act granted New
Hampshire authority to restrict interstate transportation of hydroelectric
power generated within the state.
On NEPC's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court the issue was "whether
a State can constitutionally prohibit the exportation of hydroelectric energy produced within its borders by a federally licensed facility, or otherwise reserve for its own citizens the 'economic benefit' of such hydroelectric
power."' In its Opinion, the court characterized the dispositive question
as whether the Federal Power Act protects New Hampshire's statute from
attack under the commerce clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that New Hampshire's statute violates
the commerce clause because its purpose is to gain an economic advantage
for New Hampshire residents at the expense of out-of-state power customers. In doing so the statute places a direct and substantial burden on
interstate commerce. The Court based its holding on the determination
that the state statute was not protected by § 201(b) of the Federal Power
Act.
New England Power Company is a wholesale generating subsidiary of
New England Electric System (NEES), a public utility holding company
headquartered in Massachusetts. 6 NEPC supplies electricity to three major
retail subsidiaries of NEES which distribute electricity to 1.1 million
customers in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire. 7 Among
other generating facilities, NEPC owns and operates 43 hydroelectric
units, 21 of which are located in New Hampshire. The hydroelectric and
"alternate" cheap fuel facilities produce approximately 10 percent of
NEPC's total output.8 NEPC's total service to New Hampshire through
its wholesale customers reaches less than six percent of New Hampshire's
population.'
NEPC is also a member of the New England Power Pool, whose almost
40 utility members individually own approximately 98 percent of the total
4. § 201(b) was codified as 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1976). "The provisions of this subchapter shall
apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy
at wholesale in interstate commerce, but shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy or deprive
a State of State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric
energy which is transmitted across a State line. The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, except as
specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used in
local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over
facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter."
5. 455 U.S. 331,333 (1982). The Court's characterization of the issue predetermined the outcome.
6. New England Electric System Annual Report at 1 (1982).
7. Id.
8. Id.; See 455 U.S. at 333. "Alternate" facilities are non-coal, oil, nuclear or hydro generating
facilities; they include wind and solid waste combustion.
9. 455 U.S.. at 333.
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generating capacity and virtually all of the transmission and distribution
network in a six-state area. 0 All of the electricity generated by the Power
Pool's members goes into a "power grid" for distribution through a
centralized dispatch system on an as-needed basis."
The effect of the Power Pool is to assure a reliable supply of electricity
to its members at the lowest possible cost. A computerized central dispatch
system sets operating schedules that utilize lowest-generation-cost facilities first, then bringing on-line successively higher-cost plants, regardless
of owner or location so that the cheapest available power is always used
first. The central dispatch system also calculates the cost of generation
(4/MW) for each generating unit in the Pool. The cost of power to each
Pool member is arrived at by averaging the generation cost per unit of
each facility that was available to produce power during the time period
being measured. Billing to each member of the pool is then calculated
on the "amount it would have cost the utility to meet its own load
requirements using only its own generating sources, minus that member's
share of the savings resulting from the centralized dispatch system. " 2
These savings can be considerable. The actual production of a member
company is measured against that company's actual consumption in a
given time period to determine whether the company was a net seller or
a net buyer of electricity in any given time period.
In the instant case, New Hampshire wanted to be billed solely on the
basis of the cost of power production from the hydro plants within its
borders, instead of the average cost of all NEPC's plants. New Hampshire
hoped thereby to procure an economic benefit for its citizens in the form
of lower-cost electricity at the same time it enjoyed the greater reliability
of service derived from NEPC'S membership in the Power Pool.
ANALYSIS
Historically, the Supreme Court has always been concerned that state
laws which preserve economic benefits for its own citizens at the expense
of citizens of other states may contradict the values implicit in the dormant
commerce power of the federal government. From 1911 until 1970 the
Court consistently held that, absent express Congressional provision to
the contrary, the states lack authority to regulate interstate trade in natural
resources located within the state's boundaries. 3 The policy behind this
10. The Power Pool's members operate in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Id. at 334.
11. A "power grid" is a regional transmission network.
12. 455 U.S. at 334.
13. In 1911 and 1928 the Supreme Court prohibited states from according their own inhabitants
a preferred right of access over consumers in other states to natural resources located within their
borders. West v. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
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attitude, still operative today, was clearly expressed in 1923 in Pennsylvania v. West Virginiaz; 4
"If the states have such power [to control access to natural resources]
a singular situation might result: Pennsylvania might keep its coal,
the Northwest its timber, the mining states their minerals. .

.

. Thus

enlarged. . . its influence on interstate commerce need not be pointed
out. To what consequence does such power tend? If one state has it,
all states have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines .... "
At the same time, the Court recognized the need of States to exercise
legitimate police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.
The early commerce clause cases can therefore be characterized as groping, case by case, toward a satisfactory test of permissible state-imposed
restrictions on interstate trade in natural resources. The early cases, however, took a mechanistic approach. Rules were endorsed and inflexibly
applied in each case. Inevitably the rules laid down had to be changed
periodically to account for new circumstances presented in subsequent
cases. Then in 1970, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Court finally
enunciated a test which has since become a consistently applicable standard:
"Where the statute [1] regulates evenhandedly to [2] effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and [3] its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless [4] the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."
Pike announced the arrival of the modem, less mechanistic, balancing
approach.
The modem doctrine of resource protectionism had its roots in the early
commerce clause cases. After Pike the emerging doctrine was further
developed in Philadelphia v. New Jersey6 and Hughes v. Oklahoma 7 .
278 U.S. 1 (1928). In 1927 the Court held that a state is restrained by the commerce clause from
the imposition of a direct burden on interstate commerce and that any state statute, regardless of its
purpose, which imposes such a burden must necessarily fall. Public Utility Commission of Rhode
Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). In 1932 the Supreme Court held that
"while conversion and transmission [of electricity] are substantially instantaneous they are . . .
essentially separable and distinct operations." Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 163, 179
(1932). Under this rule a state may tax the generation of electricity without interfering with interstate
Commerce. See also, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Prudential Insurance v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
14. 262 U.S. at 599 (1923).
15. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
16. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
17. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

October 1983]

NATURAL RESOURCES

The rule enunciated in Philadelphiais that a state law violates the commerce clause if the state "attempt(s) . . . to isolate itself from a problem
common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate
trade. " 18 Thus, the Supreme Court rejects state laws whose sole or primary
purpose is economc protectionsim. In Hughes the Court established the
"least discriminatory alternative" test when it refused to allow a state to
conserve minnows by limiting their transportation for sale when "equally
effective non-discriminatory conservation measures are available. " 9
New England Power Co. is actually an application of the Pike test,
modified by Hughes and Philadelphia, even though Pike is not cited.
First, the Court confronted the question whether the hydroelectric energy
that was the subject of this case is an article of commerce, since under
Philadelphiaonly articles of commerce are subject to the Pike test of
commerce clause permissibility. Citing Utah Power and Light Co. v.
Pfost,2 ° the Court decided that the energy generated in NEPC's New
Hampshire hydroelectric stations is a privately-owned article of trade, "a
product entirely distinct from the river waters used to produce it." 2'
The balancing of the Pike elements was not enumerated in the decision,
but clearly the New Hampshire PUC order failed the Pike test:
1) it was discriminatory against other states on its face;
2) under Philadelphiaprotection of a state's economic benefits for its
own citizens is not a legitimate public interest;
3) the effects on interestate commerce would not have been only incidental; and
4) the local benefits that would have been derived from the action did
not outweigh the burden imposed upon interstate commerce.
The Court summarized its Pike analysis as follows:
The Commission has made clear that its order is designed to gain
an economic advantage for New Hampshire citizens at the expense
of New England Power's customers in neighboring States. Moreover,
it cannot be disputed that the Commission's "exportation ban" places
direct and
substantial burdens on transactions in interstate com22
merce.
18. 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978). The court seems to have carved ot one exception to this rule:
Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), gave a state (Sough Dakota) the right to confine its residents
to the sale of products (cement) manufactured by the state itself from natural resources (limestone)
found within its borders. The Court decided that when a state enters the marketplace as a participant
instead of a regulator, there is no constitutional restriction on the state's right to choose the parties
with whom it will deal. Thus the state may choose to deal only with its own residents when it is
itself a producer of goods. But if Reeves had involved packaging and sale of limestone only, instead
of cement, the result might have been different. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employees, 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983).
19. 441 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
20. 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
21. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
22. 455 U.S. at 339.
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The Court then held, "Such state-imposed burdens cannot be squared
with the commerce clause when they only serve to advance 'simple economic protectionism.' "23 Once it was decided that the Commission order
was a protectionist burden on interstate commerce, the outcome of the
debate was foreclosed.
A secondary argument raised by the State of New Hampshire was that
Congress, by its failure to act, had consented to the New Hampshire
statute.24 Congress may consent to state regulation of interstate commerce
which would otherwise be impermissible,2 5 but the question whether that
consent may be implied or must be expressed had been debated widely
without conclusive decision until New England Power Co. Even after
PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Benjamin,2 6 which addressed the as yet unexplored theory behind the assumed Congressional power to consent to
otherwise impermissible state regulation, there was still debate over the
nature and expression of that power.27
A "bright line" has finally emerged in New England Power Co. regarding the implied/expressed argument. The Court has made clear that
no consent will be implied. Consent to state regulation of interstate commerce must be express." By its terms, 16 U.S.C. §201(b) saves from
preemption only such state authority as was otherwise lawful. It does not
specifically exempt any state statute, including the 1913 New Hampshire
statute, from preemption. The Court concluded:
"Indeed, given that the commerce clause-independently of the Federal Power Act-restricts the ability of the States to regulate matters
affecting interstate trade in hydroelectric energy, § 201 (b) may in fact
save little in the way of 'lawful' state authority."'29
SIGNIFICANCE
New England Power Co. reaffirms Congressional authority under the
commerce clause to regulate interstate trade in natural resources. The
23. Id.
24. New Hampshire argued that § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act is a "savings clause" preserving
the state's authority to regulate the hydroelectric power produced within its borders. New Hampshire
cited what the Court called an "isolated fragment" of legislative history in which a congressional
Representative from New Hampshire recognized that an effect of the 1935 amendment to the Federal
Power Act would be to deprive certain states of the contol then exercised over the exportation of
hydroelectric energy, and expressing "hope" that New Hampshire would be granted "the privilege
to continue" such control. The Court found this argument unpersuasive and did not find any other
evidence of Congressional intent to consent to such state regulation.
25. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1852).
26. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
27. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
547, 555-560 (1947).
28. 455 U.S. at 343 (1982). In Sporhase a better consent argument was rejected.
29. Id.

October 1983]

NATURAL RESOURCES

939

Supreme Court has consistently held that states cannot restrict to their
own citizens the benefits of natural resources located within state boundaries. As a result, a state's control over such resources is largely limited
to taxing their generation or extraction. New EnglandPowerCo. reiterates
the Court's adamant stand against economic protectionism, especially
when natural resources are concerned.
Secondarily, this case establishes that Congressional consent to otherwise impermissible state regulation of interstate commerce must be express; the Court will not infer such consent.
CELIA L. JORGENSEN

